Charles W. King

The United States has an extensive history of intervening in allied nations who’s democratic institutions who appear precarious, not only during the Cold War but before World War One as well. Throughout the Cold War the U.S. prized regional stability, continuity, and anti-communism over democracy and liberty throughout the Third World. In the First World it did not resort to the military or covert interventions. However, Operation Gladio trained European right-wings in Italy, France, and others in the tactics of terrorism and resistance in the event Communists won elections in Western Europe. The twentieth century demonstrates how nations have a vested interested in the tenor of the domestic politics of other nations.

An increasingly unstable European political scene is raising the question of how and if the United States should attempt to influence the domestic politics of its allies. Europe in general is turning rightward. Poland, Hungary, and other European countries are increasingly illiberal and eschewing institutions considered to be essential to healthy democracies. The rule of Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Viktor Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary are not the only domestic situations which American and European leaders have to consider when deciding how and where to exert influence on their neighbors. The disregard of Mariano Rajoy’s central government in Spain to Catalonia’s grievances led Catalan politicians to believe that their only resort was an unsanctioned independence referendum. The subsequent response by the Spanish government has been roundly criticized as downright fascist, drawing directly historical analogies to Franco’s dictatorship. Unlike Iran, Guatemala, Chile, or Vietnam the United States is not in a position to invade or even arrange a coup in Poland, Hungary, Spain, or any other European ally. This however does not mean that the United States cannot exert influence and should not, either overtly by explicit endorsement and critiques or through subtler measures like trade and foreign aid.

However, these center-right and right-wing governments in Europe are not the only reasons for concern for European stability. The election of President Emanuel Macron has not been the dramatic break with previous French administrations that many had hoped for, but Macron’s France is actively taking on leadership in Europe that had atrophied. However, Macron was counting on a strong ally in Angela Merkel’s Germany, and Merkel and her Christian Democrats (CDU) are currently in the midst of a flailing attempt to form a coalition government after the Social Democratic Party (SPD) their allies of the last eight years left chose not to renew their coalition after a disastrous showing in recent elections. This leaves Merkel with a raft of options that range from unlikely to unthinkable.

The expected ‘Jamaica Coalition’ of the CDU, Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP) fell apart when the FDP abruptly walked away. The parliamentary math says that the CDU could form a majority with the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD), but the two parties ran on diametrically opposed platforms. A new election could give AfD even more seats in the Bundestag, a first for a far right party. Europe faces a number of important issues in the coming months, issues like immigration and central banking which Germany has been an important voice in. The world can afford if the likes of Belgium or the Netherlands take months or even years to form coalition governments, it cannot afford Germany to be without a government. The United States invested considerable capital, political, military, and financial, ensuring that Germany would be a member of N.A.T.O., the European Coal and Steel Community, and eventually be reunited, and a strong and stable Germany is key to American interests in Europe. The United States can and should consider how its diplomatic and trade relationship with Germany has led to the current political climate and what it can do to ensure that Germany is the partner in Europe it needs.

Charles W. King

The European Union recently announced that its member states have decided to utilize Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for the first time. A feature of the Treaty of Lisbon, the founding document of the European Union, PESCO will enable greater cooperation on security and defense issues. It does not represent a wholesale conglomeration of European militaries, or even the establishment of a rapid response force under a European flag as has been repeated mooted in recent decades. It is an evolution of the existing military-to-military cooperation that has been undertaken by European defense ministries, and important innovations in their future cooperation. The integration of Dutch, Czech, and Romanian battalions into the German Army’s (Deutsches Heer) force structure will only increase, as will bilateral command sharing between Germany, the Netherlands, France, and others. The implementation of PESCO and a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) are the most significant steps towards European collective security since the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954.

After World War II, Western Europe had to primary defense questions; the Soviet Union and Germany. Initially, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization did not address the German Question. West Germany was not a founding member of NATO, and what a re-armed West Germany would do was an open question. The proposed solution was the European Defense Community, which would integrate the defense policies and militaries of Western Europe, a radical move towards European Federalism decades ahead of the economic union that had just been founded as the European Coal and Steel Community. Ultimately the French legislature, led by Gaullists in the Assembly, balked at ceding so much sovereignty, despite the potential resolution to the German Question. Ultimately it was West German membership in NATO that resolved the German Question and permitted both the establishment of a West German military and the continued presence in West Germany of American, French, and British forces.

While some of the individual measures of the European Union’s PESCO and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) may seem trivial, they represent an effort by defense policy experts to resolve some of the major deficiencies that make it impossible for NATO to function without the United States. The 2011 intervention in Libya demonstrated that even when other nations, in this case France, were the primary conductor of air strikes they could not do so without American logistical support. The United States is the logistical backbone of NATO. It possesses the airlift and sealift capacity, the tanker and AWACS aircraft, and logistical capability and expertise not necessary or present in smaller European militaries. The creation of standardized medical training, a common Staff Officer School for the officers of European militaries, and the integration of European airlift and sealift commands under CSDP are the logistical and institutional foundation upon which future military cooperation, coordination, and integration will be built. These areas represent some of the most serious stumbling blocks to both a European defense policy that credibly projects power without American support and to an effective integrated European military. While the Presidents and Prime Ministers of Europe are a long way from announcing the total integration of European defense policy and military forces, the generals, admirals, and policy officials of Europe’s armed forces have realized their greatest shortcomings and are moving to resolve these deficiencies as effectively as they can in the current political climate.

Charles W. King

Since the advent of heavier than air flight in the twentieth century military leaders have sought to leverage this technology into a military asset. The First and Second World Wars as well as the decades in-between were a period of great experimentation. New kinds of aircraft were developed and turned to new uses. The ideas of air superiority, close air support, aerial reconnaissance, and strategic bombing were developed. The wars put a priority on the development of new aircraft and dozens were developed and deployed. Subsequent analysis of the war in the skies by the United States and its allies revealed that while obvious capabilities like top speed, acceleration, and maneuverability were an asset to aircraft the two most important attributes were range and operational flight ceiling, for all sizes and shapes of aircraft.

Range allowed both greater operational areas, facilitating strategic bombing raids deeper into enemy territory, as well as increased time on station for close air support. Range was also easily apparent to the generals and designers in charge of developing new aircraft. It took longer to realize the importance of flight ceiling. Being able to operate at a higher altitude is an advantage not only for bombers attempting to avoid ground based air defenses, but also for smaller aircraft that can leverage altitude for tactical advantages. Both range and flight ceiling provided greater flexibility to both strategic planners and pilots, making them much more valuable than increasing more specific attributes of airframes like top speed.

In the twenty-first century both range and operational flight ceiling remain important, but it is the former that distinguishes the strategic advantage that the United States possesses over both its allies like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and South Korea  and its rivals like Russia and China. The United States is the only country that possesses bombers of the range of B-52’s and B-2’s. Not only does it operate more aircraft carriers than any other nation, but its carriers are of a size and type that only the recently finished HMS Queen Elizabeth comes close to. American mid-air refueling capability is second to none. Even nations whose aviation capabilities must be considered serious like China and Russia do not possess the capability to operate beyond their own near abroad in the way that the United States can. The United States is able to project air power across the globe because of its logistical assets, including its fleet of aircraft carriers.

When assessing the future development of the military capabilities of foreign powers it is essential to not only examine the new fighter or bomber aircraft they are developing, but what logistical assets they are developing. Are they developing tankers capable of mid-air refueling? What is the state of their naval aviation and airborne radar capabilities? All of these things will indicate a development of the ability to operate beyond the kind of airbases and ground based assets that are confined to domestic bases. It is these kinds of support aircraft that will indicate which nations are developing from regional powers to global ones.

Charles W. King

The two iconic weapons of the conflicts of the Cold War and decolonization in the twentieth century are the American M-16 and the Russian AK-47. All over the world the AK and its derivatives are the weapon of choice of freedom fighters and terrorists, exported and licensed freely by the Soviet Union. The M-16 has been an icon of American military technology since the Vietnam War, and it has been the weapon of choice for governments across the developing world. While the United States’ allies like German, the United Kingdom, and France may not employ the M-16, their service rifles use the same NATO 5.56mm cartridge.

The ubiquity of these two rifles is nothing short of miraculous. Since the advent of reliable firearms to Europe the militaries and governments have prized the domestic production of military weapons, frequently choosing to adopt inferior weapons that were designed and made in their own countries. The plight of Serbia and Greece in World War One demonstrate why this was so important. Weapons technology changed rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century; smokeless powder, new firing mechanisms, innovative magazines. As the nations of Europe adopted new service weapons in the heat of this rapid change those nations without the ability to invent and produce these new magazine fed, bolt action, smokeless powder-firing rifles had to choose where they would purchase their from. Serbia and Greece both selected a number of Austrian designed rifles and pistols, primarily from the manufacturer Steyr. Both had good reasons to do this, the weapons were cutting edge technology, well designed and well made, and lucrative contracts with an Austrian arms manufacturer softened diplomatic relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Both Serbia and Greece suffered greatly for their choice. With Serbia being the target of Austria’s war aims, and Greece neutral but effectively a battleground until it joined France and the United Kingdom, both were cut off from supplies of ammunition, replacements, and spare parts. For the duration of the war keeping the Serbian and Greek armies supplied would be a constant problem for both governments. Both would field a variety of incompatible weapons and cartridges as they cast around for arms, frequently signing contracts for weapons that the French, British, or Russians had deemed unsatisfactorily inferior. Supplies were so limited that for Greece the iconic weapon of World War One and their partisan fight against Nazi Germany would ultimately be a single shot black powder rifle.

This is what makes the popularity of NATO compatible weapons in particular so startling. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites manufactured AK-47’s and it’s variants by the truckload and shipped them all over the world. The countries of NATO on the other hand made the decision less than a year after its creation that they needed to standardize their equipment to insure interoperability, particularly of ammunition. Ultimately the Alliance adopted the NATO 7.62mm cartridge which continues to be in use today. Most of the other members of the Alliance wanted an intermediate cartridge more like the NATO 5.56mm that would be adopted in the following decade, but the U.S. insisted upon the 7.62mm. The U.S. got the cartridge it wanted, and the rest of the alliance got the rifle they wanted, the Belgian designed FN FAL, known during the Cold War as, “The Right Arm of the Free World.” Today NATO has approximately 1300 different Standardization Agreements (STANAG) that dictate the requirements for compatible equipment. They are so ubiquitous that the thirty round magazine that all NATO service rifles are required to fit is known as the STANAG Magazine.

Nonetheless the nations of the Alliance continue to field domestically designed and produced weapons; the British L85, French FAMAS, German G36, Czech Brens, and American M-16’s and M-4’s. Standardization has proven to be a boon not only to the militaries of the alliance, but also the arms manufacturers who produce weapons for export who have benefited the market share of NATO 5.56mm weapons for foreign militaries and individual collectors. However, the multilateral nature of the alliance has given rise to some complications recently. For the last twenty-five years NATO has been attempting to move away from its current standard 9mm pistol round, and the United States Army and Marines have been trying to find replacements for their M-16’s. Both have been unsuccessful. While the armies of NATO agree that they need a pistol round that performs better against body armor than the 9mm parabellum, which was designed in 1902. Competition between Belgian, German, and American designers has led to a road block that had yet to be resolved. Designed for the twenty inch barrel of the M-16, the NATO 5.56mm round possesses too much powder for the carbine length barrels of the M-4 and other carbines that are now the standard issue service rifle of militaries worldwide. This leads to a multitude of issues, primarily an increase in maintenance and training costs. Arms procurement, including cartridge selection, is an important strategic decision that can cripple militaries or be a great boon.

Charles W. King

Recent years have seen increasing support for populism all across the industrialized world. Many analysts have correctly diagnosed populism’s increasing popularity as a symptom of increasing economic inequality and stratification. The increased clout of populist politicians and parties in the United States and Europe should not be considered domestic issues for each to address individually. Rather is has become clear that economic inequality has broader strategic ramifications. The economic wellbeing of nation’s directly affect their political stability and politically unstable nations are dangerous and unpredictable actors on the world stage.

 The greatest global conflict prior to the twentieth century was a direct result of the political upheaval caused by the failure of France to enact political and economic reforms in the eighteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars were not simply the ambition of a single artillery officer. Napoleon Bonaparte would never had the opportunity to become Emperor if the revolutionary government of France was not forced to turn to conquest by the domestic political unrest in revolutionary France. The chaotic state of France during the reign of terror and the Directorate were themselves only possible because the Bourbon dynasty had failed to address the political and economic concerns of the French middle and lower classes. Failure to recognize and remedy economic suffering in France led directly to revolution and a war that was waged all across Europe and upon every ocean.

Saber rattling and wars of aggression are frequently used by politicians as a remedy for domestic political instability. The Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars of 1866 and 1870 helped turn domestic strife in multiple independent German states into a single unified Germany. The poor German economy in the interwar period was a major factor in the rise of the Nazi party and popular support for their aggressive policies. The Chinese Communist Party continues to rely on current economic growth and the Century of Humiliation to help it maintain political control of the People’s Republic of China. Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela vilify the United States as a way to pass responsibility for domestic poverty onto a foreign oppressor. History demonstrates that nations that are economically scared are politically unstable and potentially aggressive. At the very least they tend to be isolationist and hostile.

Economics directly affects the domestic politics and foreign relations of every nation. For decades the United States has recognized that political instability abroad in not in its strategic interest. Policy makers must now also realize that economic inequality and exploitation will damage American interests as alliances and trade pacts fissure, and angry populations promote saber rattling and the return of wars of aggression.