Charles W. King

Vladimir Putin was recently re-elected for another term as President of the Russian Federation. Egypt held a poll in which the erstwhile opponent of Abel Fattah el-Sisi told reporters that seeing el-Sisi’s name on the ballot he could not help but vote for him. The People’s Republic of China has jettisoned its post-Mao restrictions on ten year terms for President, cementing Xi Jinping’s position as the most powerful Chinese ruler since Mao Zedong. While the latter was not technically an election, it did require the accession of the National People’s Congress. All of these recent events speak to the question of states derive legitimacy in the twenty-first century.

For centuries the divine right of kings was the leading theory of legitimacy in Europe. By the dint of the will of God, the royal houses of England, France, Austria, and many more were the legitimate rules of their domains. In a very real sense both Putin’s Russia and the People’s Republic of China since Deng Xiaoping have rested the legitimacy of their governments on economic prosperity. All of these belie what political scientists consider to be the root of sovereignty; a monopoly of violence.

The crowned heads of Europe, before they claimed the divine right of kings, were feudal warlords. Historically it is after establishing a monopoly of violence over a territory that legitimacy is established. A conqueror imposes their will through violence, and over time legitimates their continued rule and the rule of their successors through the sanctioned use of violence by the state as well as other means. For many states this meant transitioning to constitutional and republican systems.

In democracies that derive from the traditions of Locke and Rousseau sovereignty comes from the consent of the governed.Elections are not only a way for the people to select their representation, but also serve to re-legitimize the state. In countries like Russia and Egypt where elections are not free what purpose do they serve? For decades African and Central Asian dictatorships have used sham elections to prove to the outside world that their rule was legitimate. The Soviet Union used similar elections to legitimize the creation of communist satellite states after World War Two. But in most cases these rigged contests are seen for what they, so they must serve another purpose.

An election is a large and complicated process, taking hundreds or thousands of people to organize. Rigging an election takes even more manpower. The ability to mobilize the people required to have the kind of turn out and margin that re-elected Putin is a clear demonstration of the power of the Russian state and Putin’s control of it. The ability to stage rigged elections is a stand in for more obvious and bloody forms of violence, but at its core it is a form of state violence. Rigged elections like those in Russia and Egypt have not only foreign but domestic audiences. They demonstrate to the population that the state is powerful and organized, and that opposition to that system is futile and dangerous. They are relatively cheap in blood and treasure compared to putting down riots in the streets.

Democracies attempt to put as much distance as possible between their legitimacy and the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence through elections and representative government. It is important to recognize that in the late twentieth and early twenty first century elections can serve another purpose, as a relatively bloodless demonstration of the state’s monopoly of violence.

Charles W. King

The United States has an extensive history of intervening in allied nations who’s democratic institutions who appear precarious, not only during the Cold War but before World War One as well. Throughout the Cold War the U.S. prized regional stability, continuity, and anti-communism over democracy and liberty throughout the Third World. In the First World it did not resort to the military or covert interventions. However, Operation Gladio trained European right-wings in Italy, France, and others in the tactics of terrorism and resistance in the event Communists won elections in Western Europe. The twentieth century demonstrates how nations have a vested interested in the tenor of the domestic politics of other nations.

An increasingly unstable European political scene is raising the question of how and if the United States should attempt to influence the domestic politics of its allies. Europe in general is turning rightward. Poland, Hungary, and other European countries are increasingly illiberal and eschewing institutions considered to be essential to healthy democracies. The rule of Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Viktor Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary are not the only domestic situations which American and European leaders have to consider when deciding how and where to exert influence on their neighbors. The disregard of Mariano Rajoy’s central government in Spain to Catalonia’s grievances led Catalan politicians to believe that their only resort was an unsanctioned independence referendum. The subsequent response by the Spanish government has been roundly criticized as downright fascist, drawing directly historical analogies to Franco’s dictatorship. Unlike Iran, Guatemala, Chile, or Vietnam the United States is not in a position to invade or even arrange a coup in Poland, Hungary, Spain, or any other European ally. This however does not mean that the United States cannot exert influence and should not, either overtly by explicit endorsement and critiques or through subtler measures like trade and foreign aid.

However, these center-right and right-wing governments in Europe are not the only reasons for concern for European stability. The election of President Emanuel Macron has not been the dramatic break with previous French administrations that many had hoped for, but Macron’s France is actively taking on leadership in Europe that had atrophied. However, Macron was counting on a strong ally in Angela Merkel’s Germany, and Merkel and her Christian Democrats (CDU) are currently in the midst of a flailing attempt to form a coalition government after the Social Democratic Party (SPD) their allies of the last eight years left chose not to renew their coalition after a disastrous showing in recent elections. This leaves Merkel with a raft of options that range from unlikely to unthinkable.

The expected ‘Jamaica Coalition’ of the CDU, Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP) fell apart when the FDP abruptly walked away. The parliamentary math says that the CDU could form a majority with the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD), but the two parties ran on diametrically opposed platforms. A new election could give AfD even more seats in the Bundestag, a first for a far right party. Europe faces a number of important issues in the coming months, issues like immigration and central banking which Germany has been an important voice in. The world can afford if the likes of Belgium or the Netherlands take months or even years to form coalition governments, it cannot afford Germany to be without a government. The United States invested considerable capital, political, military, and financial, ensuring that Germany would be a member of N.A.T.O., the European Coal and Steel Community, and eventually be reunited, and a strong and stable Germany is key to American interests in Europe. The United States can and should consider how its diplomatic and trade relationship with Germany has led to the current political climate and what it can do to ensure that Germany is the partner in Europe it needs.

Charles W. King

Recent years have seen increasing support for populism all across the industrialized world. Many analysts have correctly diagnosed populism’s increasing popularity as a symptom of increasing economic inequality and stratification. The increased clout of populist politicians and parties in the United States and Europe should not be considered domestic issues for each to address individually. Rather is has become clear that economic inequality has broader strategic ramifications. The economic wellbeing of nation’s directly affect their political stability and politically unstable nations are dangerous and unpredictable actors on the world stage.

 The greatest global conflict prior to the twentieth century was a direct result of the political upheaval caused by the failure of France to enact political and economic reforms in the eighteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars were not simply the ambition of a single artillery officer. Napoleon Bonaparte would never had the opportunity to become Emperor if the revolutionary government of France was not forced to turn to conquest by the domestic political unrest in revolutionary France. The chaotic state of France during the reign of terror and the Directorate were themselves only possible because the Bourbon dynasty had failed to address the political and economic concerns of the French middle and lower classes. Failure to recognize and remedy economic suffering in France led directly to revolution and a war that was waged all across Europe and upon every ocean.

Saber rattling and wars of aggression are frequently used by politicians as a remedy for domestic political instability. The Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars of 1866 and 1870 helped turn domestic strife in multiple independent German states into a single unified Germany. The poor German economy in the interwar period was a major factor in the rise of the Nazi party and popular support for their aggressive policies. The Chinese Communist Party continues to rely on current economic growth and the Century of Humiliation to help it maintain political control of the People’s Republic of China. Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela vilify the United States as a way to pass responsibility for domestic poverty onto a foreign oppressor. History demonstrates that nations that are economically scared are politically unstable and potentially aggressive. At the very least they tend to be isolationist and hostile.

Economics directly affects the domestic politics and foreign relations of every nation. For decades the United States has recognized that political instability abroad in not in its strategic interest. Policy makers must now also realize that economic inequality and exploitation will damage American interests as alliances and trade pacts fissure, and angry populations promote saber rattling and the return of wars of aggression.

Charles W. King

Independence is in the news once again as both Catalonia and the Kurdish region of Iraq have held referendums on the subject. The prospect of an independent Kurdistan is unacceptable to the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, and already there are rumblings of a new outbreak of violence in the region if the Kurds follow through with the independence that many of them voted for. The referendum in Catalonia has already broken out in violence, as the Spanish government deployed militarized police to attempt to prevent Catalans from voting in a referendum that the Spanish Government and Supreme Court deemed illegal.

The Catalonian push for independence from Spain raises the question of why in the 21st century a relatively autonomous region of a reasonably well off and advanced economy would seek independence. Both Catalonia and Scotland, despite possessing autonomous rule, have legitimate grievances with their respective central governments in Madrid and Westminster. They contribute significantly more to the national budget than they receive in national disbursements. Despite being profitable engines of growth for their respective economies they receive little in the way of reinvestment to ensure that they remain healthy and growing. Along with the fact that they feel like their cultural differences are ignored or suppressed by central governments, it is understandable the politicians and citizens of Catalonia, like the Scotts before them, feel like they are being exploited.

Like the legal Scottish independence referendum of 2014, the prospect of Catalonian independence would grant increased political autonomy, but an uncertain future. There exists no precedent for a member of the European Union to split, and it is unclear which, if any, European institutions an independent Catalonia would be a member of, or eligible to join. If not a member of the Euro Zone, would a Catalonian state be able to issue a currency? On what terms would it trade with the European Union? The sovereign debt crises in the wake of 2008 have empowered the European Central Bank and made European finance ministers wary. It is now common knowledge that Greece cooked their books to join the Euro, and Spain may have as well. It is unlikely that a new Catalonia would be immediately allowed join all of the European institutions that Spain is party to. The effect on the Catalonian economy while the European Union investigates the new country’s books could be devastating, even more so if the result is rejection from one or more institutions.

Prosperity in the 21st century is inextricably linked to the ability to conduct international trade. Catalonian independence from Spain could scuttle the economies of both countries. The tactics deployed by the Spanish government to repress the Catalonian referendum, in the wake of years of ignoring Catalan concerns, are heavy handed but they demonstrate the concern that the Spanish government has for the consequences of losing one of its most prosperous regions.

Charles W. King

If the failures of nation building projects in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan must serve as a warning to policy-makers what should they look to for an example of success? The Balkan nations that NATO intervened in the 1990s are a possibility; they are in the process of accession to the European Union and negotiating their own regional free trade agreement as the EU focuses on Brexit and refugee policy. But these nations are not yet finished building the institutions that will carry them forward, as demonstrated by the ongoing corruption probes in a number of Balkan states. The Republic of Korea and the Republic of Taiwan provide better examples of successful nation building projects. When they were founded in the late 1940’s they did not have the institutional foundations that facilitated the reconstruction of West Germany and Japan. Decades later South Korea and Taiwan have joined Germany and Japan on the world stage as major allies of the United States, and significant players in the global economy. They have transitioned from ‘developmental autocracy’, to borrow a phrase from Gregg Brazinsky of George Washington University, to democratic governments.

Two of the key factors in these successes were the development of state institutions and export economies. At their founding neither South Korea nor Taiwan possessed an industrial economy or plentiful natural resources that could fill national coffers and provide an easy road to prosperity. Forced to develop economies from scratch they elected to develop for export rather than to protect against foreign imports. Successful industrial export economies require an educated workforce for the research and development, and the high quality manufacturing that sustains them. It also requires independent courts and rule of law to limit corruption and provide stability and predictability to foreign investors and partners. This strong economic development at a precursor to democratization is a common historical development, not unique to South Korea and Taiwan.

South Korea and Taiwan have also each faced a single existential threat since their founding; North Korea and the People’s Republic of China respectively. This has substantially distorted the shape of their national institutions. Where the leaders of other ‘developmental autocracies’ have used Western liberalism as a post-colonial boogeyman, and made internal dissent the primary focus of their security forces, South Korea and Taiwan could afford to do neither. Confronted with these existential threats, their militaries developed as important and respected institutions of the state rather than as oppressors of the people.

Decades of economic and institution building under ‘developmental autocracy’ provided the foundations that South Korea and Taiwan needed to become prosperous democracies. They also represent two the longest and most expensive and expansive nation building commitments the United States engaged in during the Cold War. They are not the only ‘development autocracies’ the United States supported, but they are the most successful. Policy-makers should take a number of lessons from their examples; the nature of the economic development is important, and integrating the military and other state institutions as a part of the society is essential. Subsiding dictators in exchange for policy or resources will not lead to economic development or democratization but is sometimes necessary. By having a clear conception of their strategic objectives and an understanding of the differences between the successes in South Korea, Taiwan, West Germany, and Japan and failures in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan policy-makers can better determine what policies to implement and how much support they can commit to.

Further Reading

Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 2009).

James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press: 2008)

Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1998).