Charles W. King

Perhaps the most famous peace-time shipbuilding program in modern history was the Royal Navy’s ‘Two-Power Standard’. While it has been the informal objective of the Royal Navy since the 1850’s, the Naval Defense Act 1889 enshrined the standard in official policy and committed £21,500,000 over five years for the Royal Navy’s expansion. From 1889 onward it was the official policy of the United Kingdom that the Royal Navy would maintain a fleet of battleships at least equal the combined number of battleships to the next two largest navies, France and Russia in 1889.

However the Two-Power Standard raises an important issue, how would an organization like the Royal Navy know how many ships of what kinds the French, Germans, Russians, or Japanese were constructing? The answer was an organized system of Naval Attachés at embassies abroad reporting on the construction and movements of foreign flagged vessels. The United Kingdom created the Foreign Intelligence Committee in 1882, which was renamed the Naval Intelligence Department in 1887. The NID was responsible not only for gathering intelligence on foreign navies through naval attachés and the reports of British merchant marine captains and other sources, but also for strategic planning. By giving the NID these responsibilities the British Admiralty directly linked the both long term shipbuilding planning, and strategic war planning to the intelligence gathered by the NID on foreign naval assets and movements.

The late nineteenth century saw the creation of a number of the forerunners of NATO’s current foreign intelligence services, many of them directly associated with naval affairs. The United States’ first intelligence service was also founded in 1882. Like its Royal Navy counterpart the Office of Naval Intelligence was created alongside a new shipbuilding program and had its responsibilities including the monitoring of foreign naval construction and movements. Imperial Germany’s Nachrichten-Abteilung, known as ‘N’, was not created until 1901 due to the internal politics of the Imperial Navy, but it would also have the remit to monitor foreign shipbuilding and naval movements, focusing on the Royal Navy. Prior to the World War One despite a public hysteria about German spies there were very few German agents working in the U.K.. This is in part because Imperial Germany’s intelligence operations remained split between the Army and Navy. Those German agents that did operate in the U.K. prior to and during World War One were almost exclusively operatives of N, responsible for monitoring naval construction.

Even before the advent of dedicated naval intelligence operations beginning in the 1880s, such information was deemed of critical importance during both peace and war time. The Union carefully monitored British shipyards during the American Civil War for the construction of potential warships for the Confederacy. Members of nation’s merchant marine were relied upon to report when and where they saw foreign vessels in port and who had purchased a hull being laid down in dry-dock was prized information.

Today the intelligence operations of the United States and others are focusing more and more on direct action and covert operations, but historically the origins foreign intelligence services is strategic rather than operational. Naval intelligence efforts remain essential to both current naval operations and planning for future construction and potential conflicts. Human and signals intelligence about foreign military movements and capabilities are of immense strategic value and should remain a major focus of intelligence operations.

Charles W. King

Since the advent of heavier than air flight in the twentieth century military leaders have sought to leverage this technology into a military asset. The First and Second World Wars as well as the decades in-between were a period of great experimentation. New kinds of aircraft were developed and turned to new uses. The ideas of air superiority, close air support, aerial reconnaissance, and strategic bombing were developed. The wars put a priority on the development of new aircraft and dozens were developed and deployed. Subsequent analysis of the war in the skies by the United States and its allies revealed that while obvious capabilities like top speed, acceleration, and maneuverability were an asset to aircraft the two most important attributes were range and operational flight ceiling, for all sizes and shapes of aircraft.

Range allowed both greater operational areas, facilitating strategic bombing raids deeper into enemy territory, as well as increased time on station for close air support. Range was also easily apparent to the generals and designers in charge of developing new aircraft. It took longer to realize the importance of flight ceiling. Being able to operate at a higher altitude is an advantage not only for bombers attempting to avoid ground based air defenses, but also for smaller aircraft that can leverage altitude for tactical advantages. Both range and flight ceiling provided greater flexibility to both strategic planners and pilots, making them much more valuable than increasing more specific attributes of airframes like top speed.

In the twenty-first century both range and operational flight ceiling remain important, but it is the former that distinguishes the strategic advantage that the United States possesses over both its allies like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and South Korea  and its rivals like Russia and China. The United States is the only country that possesses bombers of the range of B-52’s and B-2’s. Not only does it operate more aircraft carriers than any other nation, but its carriers are of a size and type that only the recently finished HMS Queen Elizabeth comes close to. American mid-air refueling capability is second to none. Even nations whose aviation capabilities must be considered serious like China and Russia do not possess the capability to operate beyond their own near abroad in the way that the United States can. The United States is able to project air power across the globe because of its logistical assets, including its fleet of aircraft carriers.

When assessing the future development of the military capabilities of foreign powers it is essential to not only examine the new fighter or bomber aircraft they are developing, but what logistical assets they are developing. Are they developing tankers capable of mid-air refueling? What is the state of their naval aviation and airborne radar capabilities? All of these things will indicate a development of the ability to operate beyond the kind of airbases and ground based assets that are confined to domestic bases. It is these kinds of support aircraft that will indicate which nations are developing from regional powers to global ones.