Charles W. King

At a recent speech on the state of the Russian Federation Russian President Vladimir Putin announced to the world a number of new nuclear weapons. These included not only a new, longer range, intercontinental ballistic missile, but also a long range nuclear torpedo and a cruise missile that is not only capable of carrying a nuclear warhead but uses a nuclear reaction as its method of propulsion. While these weapons may seem fantastical, neither is beyond the scope of current technology. The nuclear torpedo is simply the combination of existing technologies that are already being adapted for underwater drones, and is in fact a much simpler technical problem than what many Western drones are being designed to address. The nuclear powered cruise missile is technology the United States developed as far back as the 1950’s. Engine tests were performed, but not atmospheric flight tests for the same reason the program was ultimately scrapped; the large amount of radioactivity dispersed by the engine. Western defense officials will be wise to take Putin’s statement with some skepticism, it was part of a speech with primarily a domestic Russian audience, but it cannot be discounted that the Russian Federation is developing new strategic weapons.

The United States and the Russian Federation are both investing considerable sums into their strategic weapons, but the difference between the projects being developed demonstrates the differences in American and Russian priorities. The United States’ programs consist primarily of anti-missile technology, smaller & variable yield tactical warheads, and the modernization of existing stockpiles. These projects show that the United States is focusing on the threat of smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea where regional instability increases the risk of conflict, and on the safety and reliability of aging nuclear weapons. These programs will cost the United State significant amounts of money, but they represent a desire to maintain existing deterrence with nuclear powers like Russia and China and increased capability to strike small hardened targets.

In contrast the Russian focus is on new delivery systems. The various capabilities of the three delivery systems mentioned in Putin’s speech are all designed to defeat Western defensive capabilities. They also reveal that there is a profound difference in perception between the U.S. and Russia. While the United States is attempting to maintain the Cold War status quo of Mutually Assured Destruction, Russian development of new delivery systems shows that they believe the status quo has changed significantly and they need new capabilities in order to maintain a credible second strike capacity. This cannot simply be brushed off as Russian paranoia or propaganda for domestic Russian consumption. This kind of investment, at a time when the Russian economy is struggling under sanctions, is indicative of Russian geopolitical concerns.

One of the keys to effective foreign policy and diplomatic relations is to understand that foreign countries have different perceptions of history and current events. The announcement of new delivery systems for nuclear warheads demonstrates that Russian policy makers have a starkly different assessment of the nuclear balance of power than their Western counterparts. No amount of Western assurances that the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to Poland, Romania, or South Korea will change this view, and attempting to do so would be futile. American policy makers must recognize Russian strategic concerns, then they will be able to effectively engage diplomatically.

Charles W. King

In recent years the United States has begun to deploy new methods of countering ballistic missile systems, particularly to Poland and more recently South Korea. Both deployments have explicitly been to counter the increasing capability of Iranian and North Korean missile systems.  The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have objected vehemently to the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems near their borders. Some of the saber-rattling and acts of aggression that Russia and China have undertaken recently may be a direct response to the deployment of these systems.

Why the Russians and Chinese would react so aggressively to an apparently defensive system shows how subtle the intricacies of nuclear weapons strategy are. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one of the landmark treaties of the Cold War. It prevented the Cold War from escalating further. If the US or the USSR were confident that it would be able to destroy any and all incoming nuclear weapons then they would be more willing to engage in a policy of first strike.  Both sides were understandably afraid the other would adopt such a policy. While the ABM Treaty did not eliminate ABM systems from American or Soviet arsenals, it limited their numbers of to hundreds interceptors at a time when each side possessed thousands of warheads and delivery systems. Without the ability to mount a completely effective ABM defense neither side would be willing to engage in a first strike policy. The US’s withdrawal in 2002 from the ABM Treaty did not lead to the breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime that some feared at the time, but does represent a dramatic shift in American nuclear weapon strategy.

Some observers are reasonably skeptical of whether the deployment of systems like Terminal High Altitude Ariel Defense (THAAD) significantly increase the US’s ability to intercept Russian and Chinese missiles. After all, the US already operates ABM sites in Japan and Naval ABM systems. The neglects the fact that any reduction in the viability of a nuclear deterrent is a serious threat to a nuclear deterrent.

It is this possibility, that their nuclear arsenals no longer have a deterrent value in the face of American ABM systems like THAAD, that has made the Russians and Chinese object to the deployment of American ABM systems so violently. The Russians and Chinese rely on their nuclear deterrent just as much as the US does, if not more. They have a more recent and extensive history of foreign domination than the United States does, as well as disputed land borders and off-shore claims, neither of which are an issue for the US. Russia and China have been the primary targets for American nuclear weapons since the end of World War Two, that the US might be able to use them without fear of retaliation is understandably terrifying to Russian and Chinese policy-makers. It will continue to be essential for American policy-makers to balance the need to counter the threat of nuclear weapons from pariah states like Iran and North Korea with the escalation of tensions with longtime rivals like Russia and China.

Further Reading

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987).

David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009).

Charles W. King

As the Trump Administration considers its approach to the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran it is important to consider the historical context and strategic principles at play. While at times both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. developed smaller tactical nuclear weapons with the expressed purpose of use in a ‘limited nuclear exchange’ the plausibility that a nuclear war could be limited to military targets was disputed. Since the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear weapon in 1949 the defining principle of nuclear strategy has been deterrence. Throughout numerous technological advancements the U.S., its N.A.T.O. allies, the U.S.S.R., the Warsaw Pact, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have relied on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of their defense policies.

While deterrence has largely been an effective policy, it has not deterred all acts of aggression or territorial ambitions. Multiple American administrations proved unwilling to use nuclear weapons over the Korean War, the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. That both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went to great lengths to limit direct conflict between their armed forces demonstrates the continued importance of deterrence to both superpowers’ strategic thought. For 70 years the United States and its rivals have demonstrated to the world the value of a nuclear deterrent for preserving territorial sovereignty.

There are also a number of recent events that provide important examples of how the U.S., its allies, Russia, and China treat nuclear powers differently. Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 a number of people, including Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), have stated their belief that if Ukraine had not given up their nuclear weapons then Russia would not have invaded Crimea or Donbass. The U.S. and P.R.C. both attempt to reign in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through sanctions, aid, and negotiations. The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 to prevent it from developing weapons of mass destruction. China is acting increasingly aggressive towards its neighbors in the South China Sea. The contrasting treatment of North Korea and Iraq by the U.S. and North Korea and other neighbors in the South China Sea by the P.R.C. demonstrate the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.

In light of the demonstrated historical and continuing deterrent value of nuclear weapons it must be recognized that Iran might seek nuclear weapons for their strategic value. Soviet, British, and Commonwealth forces invaded Iran in 1941, and the Soviets attempted to retain northern Iran after World War Two. The C.I.A. facilitated the 1953 overthrow of the elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh. In 1980 the Carter administration launched an attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran using American Special Forces troops. Given this history of international violations of Iranian sovereignty it cannot be a surprise that nuclear weapons would hold an immense strategic value for the Islamic Republic. Recognizing this and formulating a strategy that addresses Iran’s perceived need for a strategic deterrent may be the difference between a successful non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and a futile one.

---

Further Reading

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Stephen Kinze, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003).