Charles W. King

On April 13th, 2018, the Trump administration bombed a number sites in Syria in response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. In the aftermath much has been made of the fact that the United States warned the Russian government that the strikes were incoming. In the current political climate in the U.S. this kind of coordination with Russia is being characterized in some quarters as further evidence in support of the allegations that the Trump presidential campaign colluded with Russia. Regardless of these allegations, the act of warning the Russian government of the April 13th strikes is not unusual. De-escalation procedures like this are common, and are a specific strategic choice that the United States and other have made in the past for good reason.

Throughout the Korean War and the Vietnam War both North Korean and North Vietnamese forces received substantial aid from the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Both sides maintained that American forces were not engaged with, killing, and being killed by Chinese and Russian forces. This was a fiction agreed upon by all sides, particularly in the air wars over Korea and Vietnam. Many of the pilots were Russian or Chinese, as were the crews and officers of much of North Korea’s and North Vietnam’s air defenses. The American, Chinese, and Soviet governments understood that if they admitted that their pilots were regularly engaged with forces of the opposing super-powers the conflicts would escalate from regional one to global, and likely nuclear, wars. Despite the intense competition between the world powers, this kind of escalation was not something they desired, and the mutually agreed upon fiction allowed that. A famous example of this is illustrated in the theatrical depiction of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Roger Donaldson’s Thirteen Days. An American pilot returns from taking pictures of missile sites in Cuba with what are clearly bullet holes in his aircraft, but having received instructions from the White House he jokingly tells his ground crew that he, “Ran into a flock of sparrows.” Admitting he had taken anti-aircraft fire would have precipitated a response that would have escalated the conflict just as the United States and Soviet Union were attempting to reign it in.

Warning rivals or even the targets of incoming attacks is also a long standing de-escalation practice, though not always a successful one. On July 22, 1946, the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was bombed. The southern wing of the hotel housed the central offices of the government of the British Mandate of Palestine, the target of the bombing. The attack was carried out by the Irgun, a right-wing militant zionist organization. Attempts were made by the Irgun to warn the British, but what happened remains controversial. What is for certain is that the hotel was not evacuated and ninety-one people were killed. The attempted warnings are nonetheless important for understanding the Irgun’s objectives. The bombing would doubtless be an escalation, but the target was the hotel, a symbol of British rule, rather than the people. By trying to mitigate the loss of life the Irgun attempted to escalate the conflict, but not too much. The destruction of building and other capital expenditures without killing the people who work there remains an important, if difficult practice in the conduct of warfare.

The decisions to inform the Russian government of incoming strikes against chemical weapons facilities in Syria is in keeping with a long-standing practice of de-escalation. Preventing the direct engagement between forces of two global powers in a warzone where they both possess a military presence is difficult but essential. The use of warnings to ensure that attacks destroy capital investments in things like weapons programs without loss of life is a feature of modern warfare along with precisions weapons and advanced surveillance. Warning the Russians of this particular attack demonstrates its limited objectives and the desire to prevent escalation to a conflict between the United States and the Russian Federation.

Charles W. King

A month ago the Trump administration announced that it was cutting off financial assistance to Pakistan to the tune of $255 million. Relations between the United States and Pakistan have been strained for years due to an apparent unwillingness or inability on the part of the Pakistani government to address the presence of Afghan Taliban fighters using the semi-autonomous Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) as a base of operations. The Trump administration has gone further, alleging that the Pakistani government attempted to deceive American officials in order to receive aid they never meant to use against the Taliban in Pakistan. This assessment is not without merit; in 2007 the Pakistani military negotiated a deal with Taliban forces in the FATA after two years of disastrous military operations against the combined forces of the Afghan Taliban and Tribal militias. This deal caused strain between the George W. Bush and Obama administrations and the Pakistani governments, and numerous member of Congress have been calling for a reassessment of American aid to Pakistan for years.

The ongoing situation in Pakistan raises the question as to whether or not there is value in giving foreign aid to a country that appears to be acting counter to American interests. This means asking what is going to happen to Pakistan without the American aid it has been receiving since the Cold War, and is that going to be more or less dangerous to the United States and its interests than the status quo? Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is considered to be one of the best intelligence services in the world, punching well above its weight relative the security services of countries of similar size and development. This is due to the history and geopolitical situation that Pakistan has found itself in since independence in 1947. Tension with the also newly independent India began immediately, and in 1971 India defeated Pakistan in a war that resulted in the independence of Bangladesh. Relations with Pakistan’s other neighbors, Afghanistan and Iran, have also always been tense, prompting an outsized influence of the Pakistani military in domestic politics including coups in 1977 and 1999. Throughout the territory of Kashmir has been disputed between Pakistan and India, and concerned that the Pakistani military is unable to defeat the Indian military in a conventional conflict Pakistan developed nuclear weapons and cooperates with the Haqqani network of militants and groups who have conducted terrorist attacks in India. Surrounded by India, Afghanistan, China, and Iran and with instable domestic politics it is understandable why the Pakistani government and military consistently act to limit the risk of increased instability or existential danger.

This suggests that American aid to Pakistan was never entirely about Pakistani cooperation in the War or Terror. Given the dangers, real and perceived, to the Pakistani state from within and without and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, it is understandable that the United States would seek to prevent the failure of the Pakistani state. It is truly an example of choosing the devil you know over the devil you don’t. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s the world managed to survive the very real danger of loose nuclear weapons, it might not be so lucky if Pakistan collapsed. As distasteful as it may be to support a government with the human rights record and bellicose nature that Pakistan exhibits, preventing loose nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands might be a bargain at twice the price.

Charles W. King

As Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies prepare to seize the port of Hodeidah in Yemen, the World Health Organization and the United Nations are reporting a rising death toll from cholera. They forecast 150,000 new cases in the next month. A faction of the Hadi government has split off, without the southern leaders the government is in peril.

Across the Gulf of Aden Somalia is suffering from increasing drought. Al Shabaab is capitalizing on the inability of the government in Mogadishu to provide the humanitarian relief. Instead of barring aid organizations as they did in 2011, Al Shabaab is taking responsibility for providing food and water to Somalis where the Somali Federal Government cannot.

In Egypt the government of President Adbel Fattah el-Sisi has passed legislation requiring 47,000 local and 100 foreign non-governmental aid organizations to get approval from a new regulatory body. That body has not yet been established, aid organizations predict that it will be more of a roadblock than a regulator

On June 1st the Economist reported on Mohieddine Manfoush, a Syrian dairy farmer who provides dairy to Damascus and dry goods to cities besieged by government forces. Small entrepreneurs who could not afford to flee the Syrian conflict are filling the gaps left by those who could.

Meanwhile the United States is increasing its military support for Kurdish and Iraqi forces, both through military aid and the increasing deployment of American Special Forces and support troops, including artillery batteries. In a recent statement Emmanuel Macron, the recently elected President of France, pledged French intervention in the event of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. While the West is focusing on guns, many of the states and non-state actors in the Middle East are focused on butter.

Islamic State’s rapid growth was fueled not only by foreign fighters, but by its enthusiasm for replicating the functions of the state. As it expanded across Syria and Iraq Islamic State repaired infrastructure, instituted and enforced law, and sought to reinforce its claim to the Caliphate not only through religious dogma but by mimicking state institutions. The entrenchment of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon owe more to their willingness to provide governance and humanitarian relief than their military effectiveness.

The recognition that legitimacy derives not only from military force but also from the ability to protect and provide for the welfare of the people is not a recent innovation. The People’s Republic of China is acutely aware of how its declining economic growth may affect its legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the nineteenth century Germany and the Ottoman Empire instituted widespread reforms to strengthen state institutions and quiet domestic unrest. Providing health and prosperity engenders stability and suppot.

In Yemen cholera cases are rising and a longer conflict looms. Al Shabaab is positioning itself as a reliable source of governance and aid in rural Somalia. The el-Sisi government is increasing its control of aid organizations in Egypt. The government of Bashar al-Assad has recognized the need control over the flow of vital goods including food in the Syrian civil war. As these humanitarians crises in the Middle East worsen, the United States and the West remain fixated on killing jihadists and preventing the use of chemical weapons, and are providing guns and missiles to that end. Middle Eastern governments and insurgents alike have recognized the importance of providing milk, water, and wheat.

Charles W. King

As the Trump Administration considers its approach to the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran it is important to consider the historical context and strategic principles at play. While at times both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. developed smaller tactical nuclear weapons with the expressed purpose of use in a ‘limited nuclear exchange’ the plausibility that a nuclear war could be limited to military targets was disputed. Since the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear weapon in 1949 the defining principle of nuclear strategy has been deterrence. Throughout numerous technological advancements the U.S., its N.A.T.O. allies, the U.S.S.R., the Warsaw Pact, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have relied on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of their defense policies.

While deterrence has largely been an effective policy, it has not deterred all acts of aggression or territorial ambitions. Multiple American administrations proved unwilling to use nuclear weapons over the Korean War, the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. That both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went to great lengths to limit direct conflict between their armed forces demonstrates the continued importance of deterrence to both superpowers’ strategic thought. For 70 years the United States and its rivals have demonstrated to the world the value of a nuclear deterrent for preserving territorial sovereignty.

There are also a number of recent events that provide important examples of how the U.S., its allies, Russia, and China treat nuclear powers differently. Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 a number of people, including Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), have stated their belief that if Ukraine had not given up their nuclear weapons then Russia would not have invaded Crimea or Donbass. The U.S. and P.R.C. both attempt to reign in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through sanctions, aid, and negotiations. The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 to prevent it from developing weapons of mass destruction. China is acting increasingly aggressive towards its neighbors in the South China Sea. The contrasting treatment of North Korea and Iraq by the U.S. and North Korea and other neighbors in the South China Sea by the P.R.C. demonstrate the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.

In light of the demonstrated historical and continuing deterrent value of nuclear weapons it must be recognized that Iran might seek nuclear weapons for their strategic value. Soviet, British, and Commonwealth forces invaded Iran in 1941, and the Soviets attempted to retain northern Iran after World War Two. The C.I.A. facilitated the 1953 overthrow of the elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh. In 1980 the Carter administration launched an attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran using American Special Forces troops. Given this history of international violations of Iranian sovereignty it cannot be a surprise that nuclear weapons would hold an immense strategic value for the Islamic Republic. Recognizing this and formulating a strategy that addresses Iran’s perceived need for a strategic deterrent may be the difference between a successful non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and a futile one.

---

Further Reading

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Stephen Kinze, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003).