Charles W. King

Perhaps the most famous peace-time shipbuilding program in modern history was the Royal Navy’s ‘Two-Power Standard’. While it has been the informal objective of the Royal Navy since the 1850’s, the Naval Defense Act 1889 enshrined the standard in official policy and committed £21,500,000 over five years for the Royal Navy’s expansion. From 1889 onward it was the official policy of the United Kingdom that the Royal Navy would maintain a fleet of battleships at least equal the combined number of battleships to the next two largest navies, France and Russia in 1889.

However the Two-Power Standard raises an important issue, how would an organization like the Royal Navy know how many ships of what kinds the French, Germans, Russians, or Japanese were constructing? The answer was an organized system of Naval Attachés at embassies abroad reporting on the construction and movements of foreign flagged vessels. The United Kingdom created the Foreign Intelligence Committee in 1882, which was renamed the Naval Intelligence Department in 1887. The NID was responsible not only for gathering intelligence on foreign navies through naval attachés and the reports of British merchant marine captains and other sources, but also for strategic planning. By giving the NID these responsibilities the British Admiralty directly linked the both long term shipbuilding planning, and strategic war planning to the intelligence gathered by the NID on foreign naval assets and movements.

The late nineteenth century saw the creation of a number of the forerunners of NATO’s current foreign intelligence services, many of them directly associated with naval affairs. The United States’ first intelligence service was also founded in 1882. Like its Royal Navy counterpart the Office of Naval Intelligence was created alongside a new shipbuilding program and had its responsibilities including the monitoring of foreign naval construction and movements. Imperial Germany’s Nachrichten-Abteilung, known as ‘N’, was not created until 1901 due to the internal politics of the Imperial Navy, but it would also have the remit to monitor foreign shipbuilding and naval movements, focusing on the Royal Navy. Prior to the World War One despite a public hysteria about German spies there were very few German agents working in the U.K.. This is in part because Imperial Germany’s intelligence operations remained split between the Army and Navy. Those German agents that did operate in the U.K. prior to and during World War One were almost exclusively operatives of N, responsible for monitoring naval construction.

Even before the advent of dedicated naval intelligence operations beginning in the 1880s, such information was deemed of critical importance during both peace and war time. The Union carefully monitored British shipyards during the American Civil War for the construction of potential warships for the Confederacy. Members of nation’s merchant marine were relied upon to report when and where they saw foreign vessels in port and who had purchased a hull being laid down in dry-dock was prized information.

Today the intelligence operations of the United States and others are focusing more and more on direct action and covert operations, but historically the origins foreign intelligence services is strategic rather than operational. Naval intelligence efforts remain essential to both current naval operations and planning for future construction and potential conflicts. Human and signals intelligence about foreign military movements and capabilities are of immense strategic value and should remain a major focus of intelligence operations.

Charles W. King

Since the advent of heavier than air flight in the twentieth century military leaders have sought to leverage this technology into a military asset. The First and Second World Wars as well as the decades in-between were a period of great experimentation. New kinds of aircraft were developed and turned to new uses. The ideas of air superiority, close air support, aerial reconnaissance, and strategic bombing were developed. The wars put a priority on the development of new aircraft and dozens were developed and deployed. Subsequent analysis of the war in the skies by the United States and its allies revealed that while obvious capabilities like top speed, acceleration, and maneuverability were an asset to aircraft the two most important attributes were range and operational flight ceiling, for all sizes and shapes of aircraft.

Range allowed both greater operational areas, facilitating strategic bombing raids deeper into enemy territory, as well as increased time on station for close air support. Range was also easily apparent to the generals and designers in charge of developing new aircraft. It took longer to realize the importance of flight ceiling. Being able to operate at a higher altitude is an advantage not only for bombers attempting to avoid ground based air defenses, but also for smaller aircraft that can leverage altitude for tactical advantages. Both range and flight ceiling provided greater flexibility to both strategic planners and pilots, making them much more valuable than increasing more specific attributes of airframes like top speed.

In the twenty-first century both range and operational flight ceiling remain important, but it is the former that distinguishes the strategic advantage that the United States possesses over both its allies like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, and South Korea  and its rivals like Russia and China. The United States is the only country that possesses bombers of the range of B-52’s and B-2’s. Not only does it operate more aircraft carriers than any other nation, but its carriers are of a size and type that only the recently finished HMS Queen Elizabeth comes close to. American mid-air refueling capability is second to none. Even nations whose aviation capabilities must be considered serious like China and Russia do not possess the capability to operate beyond their own near abroad in the way that the United States can. The United States is able to project air power across the globe because of its logistical assets, including its fleet of aircraft carriers.

When assessing the future development of the military capabilities of foreign powers it is essential to not only examine the new fighter or bomber aircraft they are developing, but what logistical assets they are developing. Are they developing tankers capable of mid-air refueling? What is the state of their naval aviation and airborne radar capabilities? All of these things will indicate a development of the ability to operate beyond the kind of airbases and ground based assets that are confined to domestic bases. It is these kinds of support aircraft that will indicate which nations are developing from regional powers to global ones.

Charles W. King

The two iconic weapons of the conflicts of the Cold War and decolonization in the twentieth century are the American M-16 and the Russian AK-47. All over the world the AK and its derivatives are the weapon of choice of freedom fighters and terrorists, exported and licensed freely by the Soviet Union. The M-16 has been an icon of American military technology since the Vietnam War, and it has been the weapon of choice for governments across the developing world. While the United States’ allies like German, the United Kingdom, and France may not employ the M-16, their service rifles use the same NATO 5.56mm cartridge.

The ubiquity of these two rifles is nothing short of miraculous. Since the advent of reliable firearms to Europe the militaries and governments have prized the domestic production of military weapons, frequently choosing to adopt inferior weapons that were designed and made in their own countries. The plight of Serbia and Greece in World War One demonstrate why this was so important. Weapons technology changed rapidly at the turn of the twentieth century; smokeless powder, new firing mechanisms, innovative magazines. As the nations of Europe adopted new service weapons in the heat of this rapid change those nations without the ability to invent and produce these new magazine fed, bolt action, smokeless powder-firing rifles had to choose where they would purchase their from. Serbia and Greece both selected a number of Austrian designed rifles and pistols, primarily from the manufacturer Steyr. Both had good reasons to do this, the weapons were cutting edge technology, well designed and well made, and lucrative contracts with an Austrian arms manufacturer softened diplomatic relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Both Serbia and Greece suffered greatly for their choice. With Serbia being the target of Austria’s war aims, and Greece neutral but effectively a battleground until it joined France and the United Kingdom, both were cut off from supplies of ammunition, replacements, and spare parts. For the duration of the war keeping the Serbian and Greek armies supplied would be a constant problem for both governments. Both would field a variety of incompatible weapons and cartridges as they cast around for arms, frequently signing contracts for weapons that the French, British, or Russians had deemed unsatisfactorily inferior. Supplies were so limited that for Greece the iconic weapon of World War One and their partisan fight against Nazi Germany would ultimately be a single shot black powder rifle.

This is what makes the popularity of NATO compatible weapons in particular so startling. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites manufactured AK-47’s and it’s variants by the truckload and shipped them all over the world. The countries of NATO on the other hand made the decision less than a year after its creation that they needed to standardize their equipment to insure interoperability, particularly of ammunition. Ultimately the Alliance adopted the NATO 7.62mm cartridge which continues to be in use today. Most of the other members of the Alliance wanted an intermediate cartridge more like the NATO 5.56mm that would be adopted in the following decade, but the U.S. insisted upon the 7.62mm. The U.S. got the cartridge it wanted, and the rest of the alliance got the rifle they wanted, the Belgian designed FN FAL, known during the Cold War as, “The Right Arm of the Free World.” Today NATO has approximately 1300 different Standardization Agreements (STANAG) that dictate the requirements for compatible equipment. They are so ubiquitous that the thirty round magazine that all NATO service rifles are required to fit is known as the STANAG Magazine.

Nonetheless the nations of the Alliance continue to field domestically designed and produced weapons; the British L85, French FAMAS, German G36, Czech Brens, and American M-16’s and M-4’s. Standardization has proven to be a boon not only to the militaries of the alliance, but also the arms manufacturers who produce weapons for export who have benefited the market share of NATO 5.56mm weapons for foreign militaries and individual collectors. However, the multilateral nature of the alliance has given rise to some complications recently. For the last twenty-five years NATO has been attempting to move away from its current standard 9mm pistol round, and the United States Army and Marines have been trying to find replacements for their M-16’s. Both have been unsuccessful. While the armies of NATO agree that they need a pistol round that performs better against body armor than the 9mm parabellum, which was designed in 1902. Competition between Belgian, German, and American designers has led to a road block that had yet to be resolved. Designed for the twenty inch barrel of the M-16, the NATO 5.56mm round possesses too much powder for the carbine length barrels of the M-4 and other carbines that are now the standard issue service rifle of militaries worldwide. This leads to a multitude of issues, primarily an increase in maintenance and training costs. Arms procurement, including cartridge selection, is an important strategic decision that can cripple militaries or be a great boon.

Charles W. King

President Trump has recently transferred responsibility for the number of American troops deployed to Afghanistan to the Pentagon, precipitating a likely increase in the number of American soldiers there. This dismays those who would like to see the United States draw down its presence in Afghanistan, which has cost the US a tremendous amount of blood and treasure since the invasion in 2001, but it is worth examining why American commanders in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been so insistent on the need for large deployments of American troops to those conflicts.

Historically, the United States has relied on quality instead of quantity as for its armed forces. The US Navy was founded on the backbone of six innovative and expensive frigates. Even during World War Two when the US instituted conscription American GIs had more training than their Allied counterparts and vastly more tons of war materiel per soldier than any other belligerent. Supplying American soldiers with excellent training and inexhaustible supplies of rations, rifles, tanks, destroyers, and planes increased the combat effectiveness American forces many times over. This contrasts with the Soviet Red Army during the early years of the war, which possessed legions of able fighting men, but scant resources with which to equip them. Since World War Two the US has only increased the amount of investment, in training and materiel, per soldier. It is estimated to cost nearly $10 million to train an American Special Forces soldier.

At first glance the quality of each American soldier is the obvious reason why American commanders constantly requested more of them during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are, after all, limits on the effect a single soldier can have, regardless of how much training and equipment they have. However this ignores the nature of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without front lines and traditional engagements they had less in common with like World War Two, the Korean War, or even Vietnam than they did with peacekeeping operations. The most successful peacekeeping operations in American history are the NATO operations in the Balkans in the 1990’s. They also have the highest ratio of troops to population of any peacekeeping operation.

Different of military operations have different requirements and increase or decrease the effect of different factors. Covert infiltrations are best performed by small groups of highly trained soldiers with extensive surveillance support. Fighting the Soviet Union in Europe would have required a great deal of anti-armor capabilities. Peacekeeping requires boots on the ground. This is because peacekeeping has more in common with policing than it does soldiering much of the time. American police chiefs have long understood that an increased visible presence reduces crime, while not necessarily affecting the arrest rate. This is because this visible presence has a deterrent effect. The same is true in peacekeeping operations. The more peacekeepers there are, the more deterrent value they have, and the less they have to engage in combat actions.

This is borne out not only by NATO operations in the Balkans, but also in the effects of past surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. The question American policy-makers are asking should not be whether or not to deploy more troops. More troops will increase the likelihood of achieving strategic objectives and reduce the rate of casualties. The question should be whether the United States is willing to spend the blood and treasure required to achieve the results it desires.

Charles W. King

One of the major concepts in modern Political Science is that of credibility. For a threat to be credible the leaders and policy-makers of foreign powers must believe that the actor making the threat will follow through on it. Credible threats are what make policies of nuclear deterrence and collective defense effective. After World War Two the United States initially threatened a policy of nuclear retaliation for any Soviet aggression, but this was quickly undermined by American unwillingness to use nuclear weapons over the 1948 Soviet coup d’état in Czechoslovakia. The formation of NATO and establishment of Article 5 made American and European threats of retaliation for Soviet aggression more credible. The articulation that, “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” clarified how the US and its allies would respond to what kind of actions. Where previously it has been difficult for rivals and allies alike to predict the American response to Soviet actions, this clarification made US policy more predictable.

Predictability has a range of advantages in international affairs. In the 1980s the Soviet Union developed a system known as the “Dead Hand” or “Hand from the Grave” that would automatically launch a retaliatory strike against the United States if a nuclear weapon detonated in the Soviet Union, a doomsday device in every sense of the word. Contrary to Dr. Strangelove’s exclamation that, “the whole point of a doomsday device is lost if you keep it a secret!” The purpose of the “Dead Hand” system was not to deter American policy-makers, but Soviet ones. Knowing that the “Dead Hand” would automate a nuclear second strike if the Soviet Union was attacked, Soviet leaders would no longer be tempted launch a nuclear strike in response to a false alarm. The predictability of their own system made Soviet policy-makers confident in the credibility of their own threats of retaliation and enabled them to act more predictably towards American policies.

International diplomacy is underpinned by its predictability. Nations know that their diplomats and embassies are protected from molestation, and they know how and where to contact each other publically and privately. In the midst of war nations are able to contact each other directly or through intermediaries, which is essential to the successful resolution of conflicts. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, however there is a longstanding policy of contact between the US and Iran through the Swiss Embassy in Iran. The United States’ “One China Policy” and the Shanghai Communiqué allow both the US and the People’s Republic of China to know what is and is not over the line, so that the can avoid crossing it or cross it if they so choose. Without knowing where that line is relations between the US and the PRC would be much more fraught.

Even Richard Nixon’s “Madman Theory” was an exercise not in unpredictability but in predictability. Nixon established that he was willing to respond to Soviet actions more aggressively; this would not have been effective if it was not predictable. Nixon was not unpredictable; rather he leveraged Soviet expectations from previous administrations to create new expectations that his administration believed to be advantageous.

Predictability makes cooperation with friendly nations and deterring rival nations easier. It is the foundation of credible deterrence and effective international trade agreements. The establishment of policies and patterns of behavior on the international state are something that policy-makers must engage with actively, knowing that predictability is advantageous and descalatory, and can be leveraged.