Charles W. King

The impending closure of the Office of Global Criminal Justice, formerly the Office of War Crimes Issues, is a dangerous move away from one of the most important hallmarks of American post-World War Two foreign policy. This little known office of the State Department represents one of the essential facets of the post-war world: the establishment of new international norms. It is possible to draw a direct line from President Abraham Lincoln’s General Order Number 100, known as the “Lieber Code” through the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1926 and 1949, and the Nuremburg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials.

It must be recognized that it is not possible to prevent atrocities in warfare, but these orders, international agreements, and trials have effectively established international norms against genocide and other crimes against humanity. No body of law assumes total compliance, otherwise no system of prosecution and punishment would be necessary. This does not prevent laws from effectively what is and is not acceptable behavior. It is in the interests of the United States to participate in international conventions on what behaviors should be forbidden both because it protects American soldiers and civilians and because it is beneficial for American foreign policy.

In Erich Maria Remarque’s magnum opus All Quiet on the Western Front fresh German reinforcements arriving on the Western Front of World War One are admonished by veterans for serrating the edges of their bayonets. The veterans explain that because the wounds of such weapons are so horrific there exists an unspoken agreement between the two sides not to use them, with violators being punished harshly. This anecdote demonstrates how compliance with limitations in warfare benefits nations, by protecting their soldiers. Codifying these proscriptions enhances the extent of compliance.

American participation in the establishment of post-war norms against genocide and war crimes is not without controversy. The United States resists international pressure to outlaw both land mines and cluster munitions. Not only is the United States not a signatory to the Rome Treaty that established the International Criminal Court, in 2002 President George W. Bush signed the American Service-Members Protection Act. This act prohibits American cooperation with ICC investigations and permits the President to use, “all means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any U.S. or allied personnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court."

Despite the reticence of some in Congress and the Pentagon the United States has for decades successfully used post-war international norms for the benefit of the American people. Proscriptions against genocide and aggressive war have significantly reduced the frequency of both since 1945. The peace and stability engendered by has allowed for unprecedented prosperity in the United States and across the world. That there exist international taboos against attacking civilians makes terrorism galling to people in the 21st century, but that kind of brutality was normal and frequent recently in human history. The State Department’s active role in establishing international norms, not just against genocide and war crimes, but also in favor of personal freedom and international trade, is one of the great accomplishments of American democracy. The shuttering of the Office of Global Criminal Justice is not a step backwards, but an about-face and stride the wrong direction.

Charles W. King

The recent failure of the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons by the government of Bashar Al-Assad, let alone take action against it, raises the specter earlier UN inaction. The most gruesome example is the 1994 Rwandan Genocide where almost a million people were killed between April and July of that year. Despite many successes with long term peacekeeping operations throughout the world over its history the United Nations has repeatedly found itself unable to act in a rapid manner to prevent these kind of tragedies. The UN has received significant criticism for its inability to prevent such fast moving atrocities.

The United Nations was not designed to be able to take the swift and decisive action that would be required to intervene to prevent events like the Rwandan Genocide and the use of chemical weapons on civilian populations in civil wars. The post-World War Two institutions created by the Allied powers—the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Coal and Steel Community, and International Court of Justice—were each created to preserve the post-war balance of power by accomplishing a specific purpose. The UN’s purpose is both broad and limiting. The United Nations exists to prevent World War Three.

Like the American Congress and Senate, the structure of the UN is designed to hamper, not facilitate, efficient passage of resolutions. The General Assembly of the United Nations is a forum for debate and discussion with little concrete power. The UN Security Council has more concrete powers to act, but has five permanent members, each of which possesses veto power. This is a recipe for deadlock, not action. The UN’s largest international action, to intervene in the Korean War, was only possible because at the time the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council due to the seat for China being held by the Republic of China on Taiwan. The return of the USSR to the Security Council and the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the Council in Taiwan’s place have prevented further decisive actions.

The United Nations inability to mount such a decisive action since the Korean War belies the fact that it has succeeded at its primary objective. There has not been a direct conflict between the world’s great powers since 1945. While there have been numerous proxy wars between client states, the great powers took great pains to make sure they did not engage directly. This is in part due to the specter of nuclear war, but that ignores the role that the UN plays as a forum. The United Nations played an important role in the peaceful resolution to multiple Cold War crises, including the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis. As an official forum for nations to address each other the UN served a key role in preventing any of these crises from escalating to a nuclear war.

The United Nations’ inability to take rapid decisive action to prevent atrocities is not a fatal flaw. It is a side effect of the organization’s specific objective, preventing crises from escalating into another World War, and how it was structured to accomplish that goal. It is increasingly effective in its other efforts to help refugees, promote human rights, and mitigate famine and preventable disease, but its primary purpose remains the same. The UN remains an important breakwater against escalating tensions in the 21st century.

Further Reading

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991, (New York, NY: Vintage, 1996).

Charles W. King

In recent years the United States has begun to deploy new methods of countering ballistic missile systems, particularly to Poland and more recently South Korea. Both deployments have explicitly been to counter the increasing capability of Iranian and North Korean missile systems.  The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have objected vehemently to the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems near their borders. Some of the saber-rattling and acts of aggression that Russia and China have undertaken recently may be a direct response to the deployment of these systems.

Why the Russians and Chinese would react so aggressively to an apparently defensive system shows how subtle the intricacies of nuclear weapons strategy are. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one of the landmark treaties of the Cold War. It prevented the Cold War from escalating further. If the US or the USSR were confident that it would be able to destroy any and all incoming nuclear weapons then they would be more willing to engage in a policy of first strike.  Both sides were understandably afraid the other would adopt such a policy. While the ABM Treaty did not eliminate ABM systems from American or Soviet arsenals, it limited their numbers of to hundreds interceptors at a time when each side possessed thousands of warheads and delivery systems. Without the ability to mount a completely effective ABM defense neither side would be willing to engage in a first strike policy. The US’s withdrawal in 2002 from the ABM Treaty did not lead to the breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime that some feared at the time, but does represent a dramatic shift in American nuclear weapon strategy.

Some observers are reasonably skeptical of whether the deployment of systems like Terminal High Altitude Ariel Defense (THAAD) significantly increase the US’s ability to intercept Russian and Chinese missiles. After all, the US already operates ABM sites in Japan and Naval ABM systems. The neglects the fact that any reduction in the viability of a nuclear deterrent is a serious threat to a nuclear deterrent.

It is this possibility, that their nuclear arsenals no longer have a deterrent value in the face of American ABM systems like THAAD, that has made the Russians and Chinese object to the deployment of American ABM systems so violently. The Russians and Chinese rely on their nuclear deterrent just as much as the US does, if not more. They have a more recent and extensive history of foreign domination than the United States does, as well as disputed land borders and off-shore claims, neither of which are an issue for the US. Russia and China have been the primary targets for American nuclear weapons since the end of World War Two, that the US might be able to use them without fear of retaliation is understandably terrifying to Russian and Chinese policy-makers. It will continue to be essential for American policy-makers to balance the need to counter the threat of nuclear weapons from pariah states like Iran and North Korea with the escalation of tensions with longtime rivals like Russia and China.

Further Reading

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987).

David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009).

Charles W. King

As the Trump Administration considers its approach to the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran it is important to consider the historical context and strategic principles at play. While at times both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. developed smaller tactical nuclear weapons with the expressed purpose of use in a ‘limited nuclear exchange’ the plausibility that a nuclear war could be limited to military targets was disputed. Since the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear weapon in 1949 the defining principle of nuclear strategy has been deterrence. Throughout numerous technological advancements the U.S., its N.A.T.O. allies, the U.S.S.R., the Warsaw Pact, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have relied on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of their defense policies.

While deterrence has largely been an effective policy, it has not deterred all acts of aggression or territorial ambitions. Multiple American administrations proved unwilling to use nuclear weapons over the Korean War, the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. That both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went to great lengths to limit direct conflict between their armed forces demonstrates the continued importance of deterrence to both superpowers’ strategic thought. For 70 years the United States and its rivals have demonstrated to the world the value of a nuclear deterrent for preserving territorial sovereignty.

There are also a number of recent events that provide important examples of how the U.S., its allies, Russia, and China treat nuclear powers differently. Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 a number of people, including Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), have stated their belief that if Ukraine had not given up their nuclear weapons then Russia would not have invaded Crimea or Donbass. The U.S. and P.R.C. both attempt to reign in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions through sanctions, aid, and negotiations. The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 to prevent it from developing weapons of mass destruction. China is acting increasingly aggressive towards its neighbors in the South China Sea. The contrasting treatment of North Korea and Iraq by the U.S. and North Korea and other neighbors in the South China Sea by the P.R.C. demonstrate the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.

In light of the demonstrated historical and continuing deterrent value of nuclear weapons it must be recognized that Iran might seek nuclear weapons for their strategic value. Soviet, British, and Commonwealth forces invaded Iran in 1941, and the Soviets attempted to retain northern Iran after World War Two. The C.I.A. facilitated the 1953 overthrow of the elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh. In 1980 the Carter administration launched an attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran using American Special Forces troops. Given this history of international violations of Iranian sovereignty it cannot be a surprise that nuclear weapons would hold an immense strategic value for the Islamic Republic. Recognizing this and formulating a strategy that addresses Iran’s perceived need for a strategic deterrent may be the difference between a successful non-proliferation strategy towards Iran and a futile one.

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Further Reading

Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Stephen Kinze, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003).